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Economic and Social Benefits of Climate Information:  
Assessing the Cost of Inaction 
Abstract  
 
As investment and policy decision-makers grapple with the implications of climate change, benefits are seen in making available to 
them climate information at spatial and temporal scales that match the realms within which those decision-makers operate. For such 
an endeavour to have lasting economic and social benefits, however, the information must be carefully placed within the broader 
environmental, economic, social and institutional context within which decisions are made. This paper illustrates the challenges and 
opportunities of doing so, and uses information on the cost of inaction to illustrate the contributions that may come from 
advancements in climate modelling and information delivery.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
Increasingly, policy and investment decision-makers are seeking solutions to curb greenhouse gas emissions and to help 
communities adapt to the impending impacts triggered by current and past emissions. The debate among decision-makers to date has 
primarily focused on the perceived costs of alternative solutions, yet there will likely be also significant costs of inaction, many of 
which typically do not enter the decision-making process, in part because the costs of inaction are often unknown, diffuse and thus 
more easily shared across society, while, in contrast, costs of action are localized, their estimates are anchored on features of known 
technologies and approaches and their impacts include reduced profits and other forms of privatized gains among identifiable players 
in the marketplace.  
 
Climate change will affect, among others, water, energy, transportation and public health systems, as well as the societies and 
economies that depend on them. This paper highlights the potential impacts of climate change, the cost of inaction and the associated 
ripple effects these impacts have, for example, on reduced jobs, wages and tax revenues, leading in turn to the danger of 
underspending for strategies that may help address the climate challenge. The paper only addresses in passing the impacts on 
ecosystems, both in response to direct climate insult and as collateral damage is generated through social and economic change. 
Throughout the illustrations of the cost of inaction, the paper identifies the economic and social benefits of climate information  
A key premise of this paper is that climate will continue to change even if emissions of greenhouse gases will be drastically 
reduced. This is because the interdependent physical, chemical and biological processes in the oceans, atmosphere and on land do not 
respond instantly to changes in greenhouse gas emissions and because those greenhouse gases have mean residence times in the 
atmosphere of decades to over a century. While it is imperative that humans reduce their disruptive impact on climate and 
ecosystems, they must begin to prepare themselves for the changes they have kicked off since the industrial revolution. Given that 
premise, what are the economic and social benefits of improved climate information, particularly in the context of needed adaptation 
action?  
Responses to climate change in the public, private and non-profit sectors typically are separated conceptually into mitigation and 
adaptation actions. These two kinds of responses have often been perceived as fundamentally different. There is a perception that 
mitigation reduces emissions of greenhouse gases with benefits to the larger global community, whereas adaptation reduces 
vulnerabilities of individual sectors or regions without necessarily addressing the root causes of climate change. However, mitigation 
can have significant local benefits as well, particularly if the proverbial “low hanging fruit” of investment choices is picked, as it 
yields economic benefits that outweigh costs over short periods of time, and when no-regrets strategies are chosen, resulting in 
outcomes that make good sense irrespective of climate change. Furthermore, considerable overlap between climate change mitigation 
and adaptation actions exists [1], and spending on one can simultaneously advance the goals of the other. Mitigation and adaptation 
can promote broader goals of social, economic and environmental resilience, which will be essential to preparing society for a wide 
range of future changes, including those associated with climate.  
 
Past research and modelling have concentrated on the quantification of costs for specific mitigation measures and, to a much 
smaller extent, on cost of adaptation actions. The narrow focus on mitigation was prompted because mitigation is essential to address 
the root causes of human-induced climate change. The focus on mitigation cost was justified by the fact that the benefits of 
mitigation efforts are frequently diffuse and hard to quantify. The discussion of adaptation strategies has long been relegated to the 
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sidelines, largely because adaptation was perceived to simply provide local benefits without taking on global responsibilities. 
Similarly, the quantification of adaptation costs concentrated on the up-front financial burden to those who took action.  
 
Estimates of the costs of adapting environmental and infrastructure systems and services to climate change can provide insight 
into the very real costs of inaction, or conversely, the benefits of maintaining and protecting societal goods and services through 
effective policies that avoid the most severe climate impacts. Since it is typically at the sectoral and local levels where those costs are 
borne and benefits are received, cost estimates can provide powerful means for galvanizing the discussion about climate change 
policy and investment decision-making.  
 
These cost estimates may understate impacts on the economy and society to the extent that they simply cover what can be readily 
captured in monetary terms. The broader impacts on the social fabric, long-term economic competitiveness of regions and nations, 
changes in environmental quality and quality of life largely are outside the purview of typical analyses, yet likely not trivial at all. 
Together, the monetary and non-monetary, direct, indirect and induced costs on society and the economy provide a strong basis on 
which to justify actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Arriving at these cost estimates requires climate information at 
temporal and spatial scales commensurate with the scales at which policy and investment decisions are made, and it requires effective 
linkages of the environmental, economic and social processes that generate such information. Yet, as I argue below, the availability 
of that information is a necessary, not a sufficient condition, to generate economic and social benefits.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly highlights some of the basic tenets of standard economic analysis of 
mitigation policy and contrasts those with the conceptual and empirical challenges associated with assessments of adaptation actions. 
Section 3 then provides illustrations of the cost of inaction. Section 4 returns to conceptual issues surrounding the economic and 
social benefits of climate information. Section 5 closes the paper by sketching out a research and investment agenda that can help 
reap those benefits.   
 
2.  Tenets of mainstream climate economics and policy  
 
2.1  Mitigation costs  
 
Growing knowledge about the causes and potential effects of climate change has spurred diverse activities ranging from data 
collection and analysis to modelling and policymaking, spanning from local to global scales. With these activities comes a change in 
our perception of the role of humanity in the larger global, biogeochemical system and our responsibilities as a major influence on its 
workings. Historically, emissions of greenhouse gases were not factored into economic decisions but increasingly the externalities 
they generate are being internalized through economic and policy instruments that help reflect the cost of carbon. Such 
internalization of externalities may affect everything from the energy we use to the clothes we wear to the food we eat to the way we 
arrange our activities across space.  
 
Counteracting these sweeping developments are economic assessments and a policy discourse that suggest that aggressive 
mitigation of climate change is an endeavour too costly to outweigh its benefits. The argument rests, in part, on the assumption that 
future, uncertain benefits from mitigation make – from today’s perspective – only small contributions to societal welfare, while 
current costs impose large burdens. Mathematical relationships between select climate variables – most notably temperature – and 
economic damages – expressed in monetary terms – are solved within the confines of computable general equilibrium models that 
help determine prices and quantities of goods and services that would result under alternative climate scenarios and policy 
interventions. (For prominent examples see Nordhaus and Boyer [2].)  
 
An increasingly popular strategy for internalizing the externalities from climate change, from the perspective of conventional 
economics, is to let the marketplace arrive at optimal decisions about investments. A preferred approach is to define a cap on 
allowable emissions and to require that emitters have permits for their emissions. If permits can be purchased and sold, a cap and 
trade system establishes on the marketplace a cost associated with the emissions of greenhouse gases and incentives to reduce them.  
 
While such an approach has many advantages, it makes the long-term global challenges of climate change subject to the short-
term calculus of firms and utilities, with many of the concomitant problems that got us a world of declining environmental quality in 
the first place. The underlying economic argument is based on the assumption that markets largely are functioning well and that 
decision-makers have the relevant information available to them and properly understand that information to guide investments and 
policies. In reality, though, all markets are distorted by government intervention, influenced by speculative behaviour and subject to 
asymmetric and incomplete information as well as large uncertainties.  
 
To cushion the blow to the economy as emissions permits are introduced, a wide range of allocation schemes, other than market-
based ones, are frequently used, and sophisticated price ceilings on permits are established. The result, in essence, has been anything 
but a pure market-based solution to pricing carbon, but instead a system that functions somewhat like a tax on emissions, where the 
tax rate ranges between upper and lower bounds, and where large transaction, monitoring and enforcement costs often occur. In 
contrast, the much simpler approach of levying a tax on the carbon content of fuels has typically been abandoned for political 
reasons.  
 
Aside from the purely economic reasons that cast doubt on the efficiency and effectiveness of a cap and trade system, there are 
issues surrounding the sovereignty of participants and group dynamics as countries enter global accords to tackle emissions 
reductions. Few, if any, countries are prepared to relinquished decision-making power over their energy mix [3], and where they have 
done so, it has been largely in regional agreements, such as the European Union, some Australian territories and eastern states in the 
United States, where participants are relatively homogeneous with respect to their political, legal and economic systems. It is also at 
those regional scales that public health, environmental and economic co-benefits of mitigation actions are likely felt, thus providing 
additional impetus to the formation of coalitions at regional rather than global scales.  
 
2.2  Adaptation costs  
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While the debate about climate mitigation has been waging for years at national and international scales, we have more recently 
begun to recognize the role of changes at the local level – it is here where the impacts are felt first, and where adaptation needs to 
happen. It is also here where a frontier lies in data availability and modelling that can shed light on options to improve adaptive 
capacity and help decision-makers choose among adaptation strategies [4]. Improving adaptive capacity implies access to resources 
and the ability to spread risk, as well as economic, social and political institutions that properly access and evaluate information in 
anticipation of potential impacts and act on the insights that that information generates [5][6][7]. Choice among adaptation strategies, 
ideally, requires knowledge not only of the benefits compared to no action but also of the social, health, economic and environmental 
co-benefits and costs of those actions, including implications for future greenhouse gas emissions and for changing adaptive capacity 
in general.  
 
As with assessments of mitigation, the analysis of adaptation has been dominated by economic arguments. Mitigation and 
adaptation have been treated as substitutes, despite the fact that many local climate impacts may not be avoidable through adaptation 
should mitigation efforts be limited [8]. And where some form of substitution of adaptation for mitigation is possible, it is likely that 
adaptation actions need to persist over the time horizons over which the higher atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases – that 
are the result of limited mitigation – persist. 
 
The trade-off between investment in mitigation and adaptation is typically judged on the margin – comparing the benefits and 
costs of another dollar invested in one strategy as opposed to another. While some adaptation options may be evaluated this way – 
one could think, for example, of the benefit of adding an inch to the height of a sea wall – the real value of any strategy that improves 
adaptive capacity will likely not be amenable to marginal analysis. The social networks to deal with the human crises caused by 
flooding, the reliability of energy infrastructures to provide cooling services during heatwaves or the adequacy of institutions to 
distribute food during drought are perhaps best judged in binary terms – either they are adequate or they are not. In these cases, 
marginal economic analysis can be just that – a marginal contribution to the debate.  
 
What should matter, then, for regional policy and investment decision-making are the time-integrated impacts of a wide range of 
regional benefits and costs of mitigation and adaptation actions. To guide the global debate, those impacts would need to be 
integrated geographically [8]. The methodological diversity among local and regional adaptation studies to date poses a real 
challenge to scaling up social, economic and environmental estimates of costs and benefits of adaptation measures and changes in 
adaptive capacity. Providing ever more sophisticated climate information at local scales will not help address this problem.  
 
The following section illustrates some of the local impacts of climate change. The illustrations are chosen because they showcase 
classes of impacts and adaptation options with uncertain outcomes and potentially pervasive system-wide ramifications.  
  
3.  The costs of inaction  
 
This section of the paper provides illustrations of the costs of inaction in the United States, where arguably the greatest 
accumulation of wealth, most advanced technology and sophisticated institutions have not yet adequately addressed the challenges of 
unfolding climate change. The selected cases highlight challenges that exist in several sectors of the economy and confront common 
perceptions about the need for and ease of adaptation. They also point at places within impact and adaptation analysis where 
improved climate information can make significant contributions to decision-making, notwithstanding the limitations laid out above. 
The illustrations are intended to be neither exhaustive nor particularly detailed – more about them can be learned from the research 
and references in Blohm and Ruth [9] and Ruth et al.[10].  
 
3.1  Agriculture  
 
Historically, the bulk of climate impacts and adaptation research focused on agriculture. In some of the cases research has found 
that a combination of CO2 fertilization and changes in temperatures actually increases yields. In other cases, changes in crop varieties 
can happen fast enough to adjust a farm, an orchard or vineyard to mean projected changes in temperatures or precipitation.  
 
However, while it is relatively easy to project mean, minimum and maximum temperatures, it is often the nuances that matter. In 
the case of apple production, as with many other fruits produced in temperate climates, the number of chilling hours during a 
particular phase of the annual growth cycle is key to determining productivity. Without a prerequisite number of chilling hours, trees 
may emerge from dormancy later in spring, and with temperatures too low for too long, direct damages to trees may result [11][12]. 
Temperatures too high during the ripening period can lead, at a minimum, to discolouration [13], resulting in lower prices of 
products. Typically, both yield and quality of products may be affected, leading to declines in prices and quantities, and having an 
impact on revenue larger than the impact of each in isolation.  
 
Should orchard operators choose to substitute varieties, orchards will incur direct costs of replacement and secondary costs 
associated with diminished production from varieties waiting to be replaced, as well as the lost production from newly planted trees 
as it takes time for them to mature. Table 1 illustrates, for apple production in Pennsylvania, United States, the impacts under 
different emissions scenarios [14] without substitution for failing varieties. Table 2 shows the indirect costs associated with lost 
production, indicated by the total number of acres not producing during the replacement period. Over the near-term future, total apple 
production without substitution will be affected quite similarly for both climate scenarios, yet considerable differences exist over that 
time frame if replacement of trees takes place. How large that difference will actually be depends on consumer preferences, market 
dynamics and a wide range of other factors that have little, if anything to do with climate.  
 
But often it is not so much the direct temperature impacts on the crops, but impacts of changes in temperatures on pests that affect 
products and yields. Pennsylvania, for example, is the fourth largest producer of grapes in the United States. A primary threat to the 
industry is the grape berry moth. Typically, one to three generations of months affect grape vines in a growing season. The number of 
generations likely increases to four under a wide range of emissions scenarios [15]. While damages early in the growing season do 
not significantly impact yield – the remaining grapes simply grow larger – late season damages reduce yield. It is the emergence of a 
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fourth generation that will make all the difference. It can drive revenues from sales to zero if more than 2 per cent of berries are 
damaged, because of standards set by the United States Department of Agriculture.  
 
                          Table 1. Decline in apple production, Pennsylvania, United States 
 
 
Percent of baseline apple production (today’s production) 
 
  
2010–2039 2040–2069 2070–2099 
High Emissions 
(A1Fi) Scenario  98 per cent  86 per cent  20 per cent  
 
Low Emissions 
(B1) Scenario  
99 per cent  99 per cent  90 per cent  
 
 
         Table 2. Indirect Costs Associated with Replanting in Apple Orchards in Pennsylvania, United States 
 
 
Acres out of production during the six years of replanting 
 
  
2010–2039 2040–2069 2070–2099 
High Emissions 
(A1Fi) Scenario  1 043 6 777 38 448 
 
Low Emissions 
(B1) Scenario  
308 466 4 924 
 
Per cent Difference                        -71 per cent                   -93 per cent                   -87 per cent  
between scenarios  
 
 
As with many apple orchards, many grape growing operations in Pennsylvania are already operating at the margin. The increased 
vagaries of the climate, increased uncertainties and increases in the cost to replace trees or to step up pest management may just be 
enough to make them uneconomical, wiping out the livelihoods of entire communities. In the case of Concord grapes, additional key 
influences on the viability of the industry are food quality and safety standards institutionalized through legal and regulatory 
mechanisms.  
 
3.2  Manufacturing and services  
 
We have often thought of the manufacturing and service industries as less impacted by climate than agriculture. In the words of 
my colleague, Nobel Laureate Tom Schelling, “Manufacturing rarely depends on climate, and where temperature and humidity used 
to make a difference, air conditioning has intervened... Finance is little affected by climate; similarly for health care or education, or 
broadcasting... It is really agriculture that is affected” [16]. Yet, the manufacturing and service sectors depend heavily on highly 
reliable delivery of goods and services to their operations and on finicky markets that readily penalize cost increases and delays in 
delivery.  
 
For example, about 60 000 jobs and US$ 3 billion annually depend directly on the movement of goods in the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence route in the United States. Drought could lower water levels, requiring additional dredging at an annual cost of US$ 85 to 
US$ 142 million, simply to maintain shipping lanes. Climate-induced changes in water levels and the associated overall decreases in 
the connectivity of the shipping network will cost the manufacturing sector upward of US$ 850 million per year. The impacts will be 
higher prices, reduced income and job losses. Estimates for Michigan and Illinois suggest that for every 10 jobs lost as a direct result 
of these impacts, another 5–7 are lost elsewhere in these states’ economies. And because this is one of the manufacturing centres of 
the United States, the ripple impacts will be felt in the rest of the nation [10].  
 
Adjustments in the manufacturing sector are difficult, given the long lead times to order and deploy capital equipment as well as 
large investment needs and slow turnover rates for the capital stock. The value of improved geographic and temporal resolution of 
climate information pales in comparison to the value of information on long-term socio-economic changes that play themselves out 
in the larger context of technology and market dynamics.  
 
For some of the service industries, the impacts may be even more dire than for manufacturing. Even if agriculture and 
manufacturing can, to some extent, adapt to climate change, there is little hope in the long run for many segments of the tourism 
industry. Skiing and snowmobiling are probably at the forefront. Already, in the United States, many places need to manufacture 
snow, which raises their cost, and they face more unpredictable conditions, which makes their visitors more footloose. Even very 
small reductions in the number of season-days can mean the end of the industry, particularly in the eastern portion of the United 
States, but also for many European destinations [9].  
 
3.3  Urban areas  
 
With more than 50 per cent of the world population living in cities, more than 60 per cent of CO2 emissions coming from cities, 
with the bulk of GDP generated in cities and most of the infrastructure investments geared towards cities, cities have become major 
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players on both the mitigation and adaptation fronts [17][18]. Cities influence global and local climate conditions, which in turn 
significantly impact the cities’ functioning.  
 
By the end of this century, cities such as Philadelphia, Boston and New York can expect anywhere between a doubling and 
quadrupling of the number of days above 90 degrees Fahrenheit. This means added strain on water and energy, but also on public 
health. Increases in mortality and morbidity during recent heatwaves in Chicago and Paris have shown us just how sensitive the 
living conditions are in the most modern urban environments. And because climate change affects not every business or every person 
to the same extent, already existing disparities may become exacerbated, with typically the young, the elderly, socially marginalized 
groups and small businesses suffering the most (see, for example, Applegate et al.[19]; Martinez et al. [20]; Basu and Samet [21]; 
Pranav et al. [22]).  
 
Early warning systems with increased reliability of forecasts of weather conditions at small temporal and spatial scales could 
generate great benefits. While this largely involves weather, rather than climate, forecasting, the feedback processes that potentially 
link changes in the size, structure and consumption behaviours of urban population to local climatic conditions and global climate 
change must be better understood to guide long-term adaptation strategies beyond what can be gained from improved early warnings.  
 
3.4  Public sector budgets  
 
Research on the cost of inaction has shown that all sectors of the economy will be affected by climate change – and even where 
there are positive impacts for individual sectors, climate won’t stop changing once those optimal conditions are reached [10]. Along 
the way, widespread damages to infrastructures will begin to drain public sector budgets.  
 
Table 3 shows the cumulative monetary impacts over the 2000–2100 period for three alternative scenarios of sea-level rise and 
land-use change in metropolitan Boston, Massachusetts, compared to a baseline scenario. The baseline assumes only subsidence 
(increasing relative sea level by 0.18 meters by 2100) and continued build-out of the urban area. The ”Ride-It-Out” (RIO) adaptation 
assumes that buildings will be repaired to current conditions after a flood, with no additional flood-proofing. This scenario most 
closely mimics current policy. Under ”Build Your Way Out” (BYWO), unregulated growth is allowed in all flood plains because all 
current and future development is protected with retrofit or new coastal protection structures, which are all built following a second 
flood with a magnitude greater than or equal to the present 100 year flood. Damage is incurred until that event occurs, and as with 
RIO, affected structures are repaired to their previous state, allowing repetitive damages. Coastal protection in this option consists of 
shoreline hardening structures such as seawalls, bulkheads and revetments.  
 
In a stricter version of current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regulations, the ”Green” scenario requires that 
all growth in the current 100- and 500-year flood plains be totally flood-proofed at the time of construction and that flood-proofing 
new residential, commercial and industrial structures only nominally adds to the cost of construction. It also requires that current 
development be flood-proofed upon sale of the structure assuming a 15-year turnover rate. The retrofitting of those structures already 
present in the flood plain is assumed to be 80 per cent effective. The RIO, BYWO and Green scenarios assume subsidence plus the 
thermal expansion estimated by the Canadian Center for Climate Modelling and Analysis’s CGCM1 model [23] for a total of 0.60 
metres increase in elevation; all four cases assume that sea-level rise occurs gradually at a constant amount each year even though 
there are strong possibilities of abrupt climate change causing major changes over decades instead of a century.  
 
      Table 3. Investment Needs Under Alternative Responses to Sea Level Rise in Metropolitan Boston, United States (in millions of      












Damages    Net Gain 
Basis   1 205  4 305  937 0 0 -6 447 
RIO  3 563 13 525 2 905 0 0 -19 994 
Green   756  3 393  587 1 766 13 593 7 091 
BYWO  1 091  3 984  863 3 462 12 014 2 614 
  
 
Considerable differences exist in the cost of inaction, or, conversely, in the drain on budgets of private households, firms and local 
jurisdictions. It may be safe to assume that the positive feedbacks among adverse impacts can then undermine local economic 
competitiveness, which in turn can entrench a cycle of under-investment and under-performance. To the extent that public sector 
budget gaps are closed by levying taxes or other charges on businesses and households, what remains of private investment may be 
stymied.  
 
4.  Economic and social benefits of climate information  
 
One way to think about climate change is as a lens through which to view already existing inefficiencies in land-use planning, 
infrastructure management, public health and ecosystem health, as well as social justice. Societies have developed institutions and 
governance structures to address a wide range of threats to system performance. To these threats they now need to add climate 
change. This means making climate information at fine temporal and spatial scales readily available to the communities that deal 
with land-use planning, infrastructure management, public and ecosystem health, as well as social justice. It also means developing 
new capacities and potentially new institutions that facilitate dialogue between those who generate climate information and the end-
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user communities to ensure that the science and modelling are carried out in ways that indeed connect with end-user needs and that 
the vehicles for information sharing and the process of communication are meaningful to all parties.  
 
Assuming that climate change functions as a multiplier of already existing threats to system performance, then climate 
information by itself is only one of many inputs into the investment and policy decision-making process. Engineering information on 
the performance characteristics of infrastructures, demographic information on the size, composition and location of populations, 
geographic information on land use and land cover changes, environmental information on ecosystem health, economic information 
on consumptive behaviours all must, and do, inform mitigation and adaptation strategies. Since institutions already are set up to deal 
with some of that information – though arguably not necessarily in the most integrative form – preponderance of the weight in 
decisions on whether and how to address climate challenges tends to be given to that information. Advances in the resolution and 
delivery of climate information may only have marginal economic and social benefit.  
 
However, if climate change functions as a multiplier of existing threats, then climate information itself can have a multiplier 
effect for the value of other pieces of information that enter investment and policy decision-making. Realizing that multiplier 
function can have both a danger and great opportunities for generating environmental, social and economic benefits. The remainder 
of this section addresses the danger of using climate information to leverage other forms of information used in investment and 
policymaking. Section 5 then turns to opportunities that lie ahead.  
 
As the scientific community argues for more widespread use of climate information in investment and policymaking, one 
recognizes that the spectre of rising climate vulnerabilities is increasingly used as a “need magnifier”, whereby projections about, for 
example, increases in mean temperatures or the frequency and severity of extreme weather events are used to support various policy 
and investment proposals – whether climate is an important factor in a system’s performance or not. For example, efforts to promote 
a particular land-use plan, energy source or particular local industry may be deemed more acceptable if it can be argued that these 
have an important role to play in adapting to climate change or mitigating its effects. What may be perceived as desirable from a 
narrow sectoral perspective, such as expansion of nuclear power to provide carbon-free energy, may make little sense in the context 
of more systemic adaptation to climate change, in which, for example, shortages of cooling water and rising risks of disruptions of 
transmission grids bound the solution space within which narrow perspectives may make sense. Improvements in the spatial and 
temporal resolution of climate information and increases in the accuracy of climate models will both be essential to efforts that try to 
keep public discourse about investments and policies honest.  
 
5.  The road ahead for better climate information  
 
Throughout this paper, I have hinted at the notion that the benefits from improved climate information will come from linking it 
to economic and social information, and placing it into the environment within which investment and policy decisions are made. For 
this linkage to be successful, the corresponding socio-economic data needs to be available at comparable resolutions. Being able to 
know with some degree of certainty when, where and for how long a heatwave may last is of little value for policymakers if they do 
not know, for example, the energy use profiles of affected populations and businesses in a region, but instead have that information 
available to them in aggregate form, and with long delays between data collection and decision times. Indeed, there is little economic 
and social value of highly accurate and disaggregated climate information if economic and social information remains lumpy and 
spotty. Furthermore, for high-resolution climate information to be ultimately used, there needs to be intensive involvement of the 
various stakeholder communities.  
 
Many researchers and practitioners have begun to forge connections between the climate and the investment and policy 
communities, and in the process, they have been able to debunk some rather persistent myths – three of which are discussed here.  
 
5.1  The myth of the low-hanging fruit  
 
The first of the myths surrounding opportunities to address climate change and its impacts is that all the low-hanging fruit has 
already been picked – all the easy adjustments have already been made and from here on out, mitigation and adaptation costs will 
skyrocket. Actually, as businesses, cities, regions and entire countries view their “normal” investment and policy decisions through 
the climate change lens, they find that they so far had picked the fruit that was so ripe that it fell on the ground. As they begin to 
explore their options more thoroughly and creatively, they recognize that they have barely begun to bend existing trends in emissions 
reductions and advancements in adaptive capacity into more favourable directions. Clearly, a value of climate information comes in 
pointing at the growing urgency for action and being able to connect that information to the particularities of individually, 
environmentally, socially and economically acceptable options.  
 
5.2  The myth of the silver bullet  
 
The second myth is that of the silver bullet – one strategy that can help make a big difference, be it nuclear power, carbon capture 
and sequestration or any other strategy. The list of possibilities is long. Even in a world with infinitely available energy and no 
climate impact, humanity may still face major environmental and climate change challenges as long as that energy is used to convert 
ever more materials, infringe on ecosystem performance and generate economic growth.  
 
Instead of a silver bullet, “silver buckshot” is needed – a multi-pronged approach that is sensitive to the local situation now and 
under new climate and socio-economic conditions. Again, one cannot identify, select and implement effective responses to the 
climate challenge without more refined climate and socio-economic information.  
 
5.3  The myth of the separability of mitigation and adaptation  
 
It is increasingly recognized that there are many adaptation benefits that can come from mitigation strategies, and vice versa. 
Using renewable resources and decentralizing power supply, for example, can reduce the carbon footprint and also reduce 
susceptibility of power supply and thus benefit the economy and public health under extreme weather events. Being able to separate 
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mitigation and adaptation conceptually may be a myth in many instances. If they are unable to properly assess co-benefits of 
mitigation and adaptation, decision-makers may not choose some strategies that make good sense from a broader system perspective. 
There is no way one can quantify with sufficient accuracy those social and economic co-benefits without having the necessary 
climate, social and economic information integrated with each other.  
 
In short, the social and economic benefits from climate information are closely tied to the resolution of that information, the 
sophistication of the recipient of that information, the adequacy of the information exchange between the scientific and end-use 
communities, and the extent to which the use of climate information itself is informed by the broader environmental, economic and 
social context within which climate change is playing itself out. Research faces formidable challenges to capitalize on the social and 
economic benefits promised by improvements in climate information. The corresponding research agenda will require increased 
participation from the social science and end-user communities. Much of what needs to be done within each discipline is known. The 
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